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Abstract
Delivery games, introduced by Hamers, Borm, van de Leensel and Tijs (1994),a r e
combinatorial optimizationgames that arise from delivery problems closelyrelated to the
Chinese postman problem (CPP). They showed that delivery games are not necessarily
balanced. For delivery problems corresponding to the class of bridge-connected Euler
graphs they showed that the related games are balanced.
This paper focuses on the concavity property for delivery games. A delivery game
arising from a delivery model correspondingto a bridge-connected Euler graph needs not
tobeconcave. Themainresultwillbethatfordeliveryproblemscorrespondingtotheclass
of bridge-connected cyclic graphs, which is a subclass of the class of bridge-connected
Euler graphs, the related delivery games are concave.
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1 Introduction
The delivery situations, introduced in Hamers, Borm, van de Leensel and Tijs (1994),a r e
deﬁned on a connected graph in which a cost function is deﬁned on the edges. For these
situations, which are closely related to the Chinese postman problem (cf. Mei-Ko Kwan
(1962)), they deﬁned a new class of combinatorial optimization games called delivery games.
They showed that these games need not to be balanced. For delivery situations corresponding
to bridge-connected Euler graphs they showed that the related delivery games are balanced.
This paper focuses on the concavity property of delivery games. A game satisﬁes the
concavity property if the characteristic function of a delivery game is a sub-modular function.
In general a delivery game is not concave, since concavity would imply that the game is
balanced. But even for the class of balanced games corresponding to the delivery problems
that arise from bridge-connected Euler graphs concavity is not necessarily satisﬁed. We will
show that for delivery games corresponding to the class of bridge-connected cyclic graphs,
which is a subclass of the class of bridge-connected Euler graphs, the related delivery games
are concave.
There are several arguments to ask for convavity. Concave games are balanced, which
means that one can ﬁnd core-elements prescribing an allocation of the worth of the grand
coalition among the players in such a way that no subgroup has an incentive to split off.
Moreover, Shapley (1971) (cf. Edmonds (1970))a n dIshiichi (1980) showed that the extreme
pointsofthecorearethemarginalvectors ofthegameif and onlyif thegameis concave. Here,
a marginal vector allocates to each player the marginal contribution this player constitutes
accordingto agiven way(apermutation)to formthegrandcoalition. Withrespect to one-point
game theoretical solution concepts, concave games are nice since the Shapley value (Shapley
(1953)), which is by deﬁnition the average of all marginal vectors, is in the barycentre of the
core. Further, the -value (Tijs (1981)), which is an efﬁcient compromise between an utopia
vector and a minimal right vector, can be easily calculated.
Concavity, oritscounterpartconvexity (super-modular),isararepropertyforcombinatorial
games. Only two classes of sequencing games, considered in Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs
(1989) and Hamers, Borm and Tijs (1992), are contained in the class of convex games. Other3
combinatorial games, e.g. minimum spanning tree games (cf. Granot and Huberman (1981))
and traveling sales man games (cf. Potters, Curiel and Tijs (1992), do not posses the concavity
property.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the delivery game is formulated and an
example is provided that a delivery game corresponding to delivery problem that arises from a
bridge-connectedEulergraphisnotnecessarily concave. Then themaintheoremisformulated.
Section 3 proves the rather technical theorems and lemmata needed for the concavity result.
2 Delivery problems and delivery games
This section describes the class of delivery models and the corresponding delivery games as
introduced in Hamers, Borm, van de Leensel and Tijs (1994). Before the formal description
is provided we need some deﬁnitions.Let G =( V;E;i) be an undirected connected graph
where V is the set of vertices, E the set of edges and and i the incidence mapping that assigns
to each edge of E an unordered pair of not necessarily different vertices of V .A walk in
G =( V;E;i)is a ﬁnite sequence of edges and vertices of the form v1;e 1;v 2;:::;ek;v k+1 with
k  0;v 1;:::;vk+1 2 V;e1;:::;ek 2 E such that i(ej)=f v j;v j+1g for all j 2f 1 ;:::;kg. Such
aw a l ki saclosed walk if v1 = vk+1. A closed walk in which all edges are distinct is called a
closed trail. A path in G is a walk in which all vertices (except, possibly v1 = vk+1) and edges
are distinct. A closed path, i.e. v1 = vk+1, containing at least one edge is called a circuit.
Let G =( V;E;i) be a connected graph. We assume that each edge corresponds to one
player. Formally, there is a one-one map g : E ! N,w h e r eN=f 1 ;:::;j E jg is the set of
players. Further, we pick a vertex v0 2 V which is called the post ofﬁce of G. We now deﬁne
an S-tour of a coalition S as a closed walk that starts in the post ofﬁcev0 and visits each edge
that corresponds to a player of S at least once. Formally, we have
Deﬁnition 1 Let G =( V;E;i;v0) be a connected undirected graph in which v0 2 V is
the post ofﬁce. Then an S-tour is a closed walk v0;e 1;v 1;:::;vk−1;e k;v 0 in G such that
S f g ( e j)jj2f 1 ;:::;kgg.
The set of S-tours of a coalition is denoted by D(S).
To the edges of the graph G we assign deliver costs d : E ! [0;1) and travel costs4
t : E ! [0;1). A postman who has to deliver the mail to a coalition S has to pick an S-tour
v0;e 1;v 1;:::;vk−1;e k;v 02D(S). Each time the postman visits an edge the travel costs of this
edge is charged. In case the postman makes a delivery in a street the deliver costs of this street
is also charged. Formally, the costs of an S-tour v0;e 1;v 1;:::;vk−1;e k;v 0are equal to





e 2 g − 1( S)
d ( e ) (1)
We assume that in any S-tour each street of S pays its own speciﬁc deliver costs and also
once his speciﬁc travel costs. Hence, each player of S has individual ﬁxed costs. The sum
of these ﬁxed costs of the members of S is equal to
P
e2g−1(S)(t(e)+d ( e )) and are called the
non-separable costs of an S-tour. Note that the non-separable costs are independent of the
chosen S-tour. We will call the remaining costs of an S-tour the separable costs of an S-tour.
Consequently, we can rewrite expression (1) as the sum of non-separable costs and separable
costs, i.e.
CS(v0;e 1;:::;vk−1;e k;v 0)=[
X
e 2 g − 1( S )







Since each coalition S wants to be delivered as cheap as possible, it will choose an S-tour in
D(S) that minimizes (2). Since the non-separable costs are independent of the chosen S-tour
coalition S will choose an S-tour in D(S) that minimizes







We call such an S-tour a minimal S-tour.
In thefollowingadelivery problemis denoted byΓ=( N;(V;E;i;v0);t;g). Here, N isthe
set of players, (V;E;i;v0) is a connected graph in which v0 is the post ofﬁce, t : E ! [0;1)
assigns the travel costs to the edges and g gives the one-one correspondence between edges
and players. The class of delivery problems corresponding to the player set N is denoted by
DP(N). Note that the function d : E ! [0;1) which assigns the deliver costs to the edges is
omitted in the description of Γ since it does not affect the choice of a minimal tour (cf. (3)).
Beforedelivery games areformallyintroducedwe recall some well known factsconcerning
cooperativegames.Acooperativecostgameisapair(N;c)whereN isaﬁnitesetofplayersand
c is a mapping c :2 N !Rwith c(;)=0and 2N is the collection of all subsets of N:Ag a m e
( N;c) is called concave if for all coalitions S;T 2 2N and all i 2 N with S  T  Nnfig it
holds that
c(T [f i g )−c ( T)c ( S[f i g )−c ( S) :5
Hence, a game (N;c) is concave if and only if the map c :2 N !Ris sub-modular. A core
element x =( x i) i 2 N 2R Nis such that no coalition has an incentive to split of, i.e.
X
i2N
xi = c(N)a n d
X
i 2 S
x i c ( S ) for all S 2 2
N:
The core Core(c) consists of all core elements. A game is called balanced if its core is
non-empty. The results of Shapley (1971) and Ishiichi (1980) give that concavity implies
balancedness.
By deﬁning the cost value of a coalition S as the separable costs of a minimal S-tour, we
obtain a cooperative game corresponding to a delivery problem. This cooperative game is
called the delivery game and is formal deﬁned in following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 Thedeliverygame(N;c)corresponding toΓ=( N;(V;E;i;v0);t;g)2DP(N)
is deﬁned for all S  N by









The following example illustrates a delivery game and shows that these games need not to
be balanced.
Example 1 Let V = fv0;v 1;v 2;v 3g;E = fe 1;e 2;e 3;e 4;e 5g and i is deﬁned by i(e1)=
f v 0 ;v 1g;i(e 2)=f v 1 ;v 2g;i(e 3)=f v 2 ;v 3g;i(e 4)=f v 0 ;v 3g;i(e 5)=f v 0 ;v 2g (see ﬁgure
1).
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Let t(e)=1for all e 2 E and g(ej)=j;j 2f 1 ;:::;5g. Then c(N)=1since
v0;e 1;v 1;e 2;v 2;e 3;v 3;e 4;v 0;e 5;v 2;e 5;v 0 is a minimal N-tour with separable costs equal to
t(e5)=1 . For all S 2 A := ff1;2;5g;f3;4;5g;f1;2;3;4gg we have that c(S)=0 . Suppose
x 2 Core(c), then








c ( S )=0 :
Contradiction, so no core elements exists.6
Hamers et al.(1994) showed that delivery games arising from delivery problems corre-
sponding to bridge-connectedEuler graphsare balanced. An edgeb 2 E is called a bridgeof a
connected graph G =( V;E;i)if the graph ^ G =( V;E−fbg;i jE−fbg) is a disconnected graph.
A connected graph G =( V;E;i) . Then a graph G =( V;E;i) is called a bridge-connected
Euler graph if all the components of the graph ^ G =( V;E−B(G);i jE−B(G))are Euler graphs.
Here, B(G) is the set of bridges of G. The following example shows that delivery games
arising from delivery games corresponding to bridge-connected Euler graphs need not to be
concave.
Example 2 Let K7 be the complete graph with seven vertices. Obviously, it is an Euler graph
and, consequently a bridge-connected Euler graph. In ﬁgure 1 the notation e1;1 means that
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Take the following coalitions: T = fg(e3);g(e 4);g(e 6)g,S =fg(e 3)gand fig = fg(e2)g.
The minimal T-tour is equal to v0;e 6;v 4;e 3;v 5;e 4;v 6;e 5;v 0. Hence, c(T)=t ( e 5)=2 .T h e
minimalT[fig-tourisequaltov0;e 6;v 4;e 3;v 5;e 4;v 6;e 9;v 2;e 2;v 1;e 1;v 0. Hence,c(T[fig)=
t ( e 1)+t ( e 9)=2 :The minimal S-tour is equal to v0;e 6;v 4;e 3;v 5;e 7;v 0. Hence, c(S)=
t ( e 6 )+t ( e 7)=6 . The minimal S [f i g -tour is equal to v0;e 6;v 4;e 3;v 5;e 8;v 2;e 2;v 1;e 1;v 0.
Hence, c(S [f i g )=t ( e 6 )+t ( e 8)+t ( e 1)=5 :This implies that the delivery game is not
concave, since c(T [f i g )−c ( T)=0>− 1=c ( S[f i g )−c ( S) :
2
The ﬁnal part of this section states that delivery games corresponding to delivery problems
arising from bridge-connected cyclic graphs are concave games. A graph G =( V;E;i) is
calledabridge-connectedcyclicgraphifallcomponentsofthegraph(V;E;ijE−B(G))areunion
of circuits or single vertices. Hence, all circuits in such a graph are edge-disjoint. Note that7
the class of bridge-connected cyclic graph is a subclass of the class of bridge-connected Euler
graphs.
Before the formal proof of this concavity result is presented in the next section we will give
a short description of the construction of this proof. First we show that if the underlying graph
of the delivery problem is a circuit or the union of a circuit and a bridgethen the corresponding
delivery game is concave. Second we introduce bridge-connected circuit graphs. These are
the graphs that after removing the bridges only have circuits or single vertices as components.
Hence, here the circuits are vertex disjoint. It is shown with the help of the results on circuit
(with a bridge) graphs and some reduction lemma’s that also delivery games are concave
that arise from delivery problems corresponding to bridge-connected circuit graphs. Finally,
we proof concavity for bridge-connected cyclic graphs by giving an extension of a bridge-
connected circuit graph to a bridge-connected cyclic graph.
Theorem 1 Eachdeliverygamethatarisesfromadeliveryproblemcorresponding toabridge-
connected cyclic graph is a concave game.
3 Proof main result
For the formal proof we need some new notations. Let DE(N) represent the deliv-
ery problems corresponding to a weakly cyclic graph. We assume in this section that
Γ=( N;(V;E;i;v0);t;g)2 DE(N).T a k e j2 Nand let e 2 E be such that g(e)=j .
Next, take S  T  Nnfjg and abbreviate a minimal delivery tour of coalition S,S [f jgT
and T [f jgby d1;d 2;d 3and d4, respectively.
Let Γ=( N;(V;E;i;v0);t;g)and let U  N.L e td=v 0 ;e 1;:::;ek;v 0 2D(U), then the
separable travel costs of the delivery tour d with respect to U and a subset of edges E0  E is
given by a function f
Γ;E0





j : e j2 E 0
t ( e j)−
X
e 2 g − 1( U) \ E 0
t ( e ) : (5)
Note that in case d is a minimal delivery tour of U in Γ we have for the corresponding delivery
game (N;c) that c(U)=f
Γ ;E
d (U) (cf. (4)). For a delivery problem that arises from a circuit
the following lemma shows that in case e 62 d1, then there are only three possible tours for d2.
Notethat inthefollowinglemmawehavethreepossibilitiesinwhich waye canbesurrounded8
by a coalition S. The most important one is case (a) in lemma 1). The other two cases, (case
(b) and (c) in lemma 1), will not be considered in this paper, but will be given in lemma 1 for
completeness. (See also the remark after the proof of lemma 1).9
Lemma 1 Let Γ=( N;(V;E;i;v0);g;t)2 DE(N) be a delivery problem and let (V;E;i)
be the circuit v0;e 1;v 1;:::;vm−1;e m;v 0.L e tkbe such that ek = e. (a) If there exists s1;s 2 2
S;s1 <k<s 2such that d1 := v0;e 1;:::;es1;v s 1;e s 1;:::;e1;v 0;e m;:::;es2;v s 2−1;e s 2;:::;em;v 0



















v0;e 1;:::;em;v 0 (8)

































































(b) If there exists s1 2 S;s1 <ksuch that d1 := v0;e 1;:::;es1;v s 1;e s 1;:::;e1;v 0is the unique
minimal S-tour, then d2 is one of the following three tours:













(c) If there exists s2 2 S;s2 >ksuch that d1 := v0;e m;:::;es2;vs2;e s 2;:::;em;v 0is the unique















v0;e 1;:::;em;v 0 (14)
PROOF: Since the proofs of the cases (b) and (c) are similar to (a), we only provide the
proof of (a). Let u1;u 2 2 S such that u1 <u 2 s 1or s2  u1 <u 2 . Moreover,
for each k 2 N with u1 <k<u 2we must have k 62 S. Consider the delivery tour
d := v0;e 1;:::;eu1;vu1;e u 1;:::;e1;v 0;e m;:::;eu2;v u 2−1;e u 2;:::;em;v 0. We will show that for
coalition S [f jgthe costs of the delivery tour v0;e 1;:::;em;v 0 are smaller then the costs of
d. Hence, the only possible minimal S-toursare the tours (6), (7) or (8). We may assume that10
u1 <u 2s 1. First we derive an inequality which follows from the fact that d is a delivery
tour of S but not a minimal one. We have
0 <f
Γ ;E









p = u 2


























Take now for d2 expression (8). Then
f
Γ;E












u 2− 1 X















s 2− 1 X















p = u 2
2 t ( e p)−
X
e 2 g − 1( S[fjg)
t(e)=f
Γ ;E
d (S [f jg )
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (15). Hence, d is not a minimal delivery tour of
S [f jg . This gives that the only three possible minimal delivery tours of coalition S [f jg
are given by (6), (7) or (8). For he special case that u1 = s1 or u2 = s2 we have to
pick for d := v0;e m;:::;eu1;v u 1;e u 1;:::;em;v 0 or d := v0;e 1;:::;eu2;v u 2−1;e u 2;:::;em;v 0,
respectively. Now we can show in a similar way that d is not optimal.
2 Remark:
In the following we restrict attention to case (a) of lemma 1, i.e. we assume that the edge e is
surrounded by two edges of S. This is possible since the proofs that follow can be elaborated
to the cases (b) and (c) of lemma 1 using the same techniques that will be demonstrated for
case (a).
The followingtheoremshows that adelivery gamecorrespondingto a deliveryproblemthat
arises from a circuit graph is concave.11
Theorem 2 LetΓ=( N;(V;E;i;v0);g;t)2DE(N)beadeliveryproblemandlet(V;E;i)be
the circuit v0;e 1;v 1;:::;vm−1;e m;v 0. Then the corresponding delivery game(N;c)is concave.
PROOF:Let k be such that ek = e. Then we have to show that
c(T [f jg )−c ( T)c ( S[f jg )−c ( S) : (16)
for S  T  Nnfjg: We have to consider four cases:(i) ek 2 d1;e k 2 d 3:It follows that
d1 = d2 and d3 = d4. Consequently,
c(S [f jg )−c ( S)=c ( T[f jg )−c ( T)=− t ( e
k)
Hence, relation (16) is satisﬁed. (ii) ek 62 d1;e k 2d 3:Since ek 62 d1, we have that the delivery
tour d1 is equal to v0;e 1;:::;es1;v s 1;es1;:::;e1;v 0;e m;:::;es2;v s 2−1;e s 2;:::;em;v 0 where s1 <
k<s 2. Since, ek 2 d2 we have by lemma 1 (a) that d2 is one of the tours given by (6), (7) or
(8). Choosing expression (6) yields






p = s 2
2 t ( e
p)−
X








p = s 2
2 t ( e
p)−
X
e 2 g − 1( S) g
t ( e ) g
=− t ( e
k)+
k − 1 X
p = s 1+1
2t(e
p) − t ( e
k)=c ( T[f jg )−c ( T)
where the last equality follows from d3 = d4. Hence, (16) is satisﬁed.An analogous result is
obtained when we choose (7) for d2. Finally, choose (8) for d2. Then














p = s 2
2 t ( e
p)−
X
e 2 g − 1( S)

















The inequality follows from the fact that e1;:::;em is a delivery tour of S, but not necessarily
a minimal one. Hence, (16) is satisﬁed. (iii) ek 62 d1;e k 62 d3Take for d1 t h es a m et o u ra s
in (ii). Consequently, d2 is equal to one of the expressions (6), (7) or (8). Moreover, since
ek 62 d3 we have that d3 is equal to v0;e 1;:::;et1;v t 1;e t 1;:::;e1;e m;:::;et2;v t 2−1;e t 2;:::;em;v 0








t 2;:::;em;v 0 (17)12




Let d2 be equal to (6). Then
c(S [f jg )−c ( S)=− t ( e
k)+
k − 1 X
p = s 1+1
2t(e
p)
− t ( e
k)+
k − 1 X
p = t 1+1
2t(e
p)  c(T [f jg )−c ( T) :
Theﬁrstinequalityholdsbys1  t1 andthesecondinequalityholdssince(17)isnotnecessarily
a minimal tour of T [f jg .In case d2 is equal to (7) we obtain a similar result. Finally, take d2
equal to (8), then












p = s 2
2 t ( e p)−
X
e 2 g − 1( S)














p = t 2
2 t ( e p)−
X
e 2 g − 1( T)
t ( e ) g
c ( T[f jg )−c ( T)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that e1;:::;em is a delivery tour of T [f j g ,
but not necessarily a minimal delivery tour. (iv) ek 2 d1;e k 62 d3We will prove that this
case is not possible by showing that if ek 62 d3 then ek 62 d1.T a k e f o r d 3the same tour as
in (iii) and note that we may assume that it is the unique minimal delivery tour. Suppose
^ d = v0;e 1;:::;eu1;v u 1;e u 1;:::;e1;v 0;e m;:::;eu2;v u 2−1;e u 2;:::;em;v 0is a minimaldeliverytour
of S that contains ek. Then u2  u1  t2 or t1  u2  u1 since fet1+1;:::;et2−1g\T =; .
Since d3 is also a delivery tour of S we have by the minimality of ^ d that
0 >f
Γ ;E









p = u 2




























Fromthefactsthatv0;e 1;:::;em;v 0isadeliverytourofT andd3 is theuniqueminimaldelivery
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p = t 2
t ( e
p)−
t 2− 1 X
p = t 1+1
t(e
p):










p = t 2
t ( e
p) (21)




p=u1+1 t(ep). Combining this result with inequality










which contradicts inequality (20). Similarly we get a contradiction in case u2  t1. Hence,
we may concludethat we have a contradictionwith theassumption that ^ d is a minimal delivery











and again we have a contradiction. So, ek is not contained in any minimal delivery tour of S
whenever ek 62 d3.
2
The following theorem shows that a delivery game corresponding to a delivery problem
that arises from a graph existing of one circuit and one bridge that is not connected to the post
ofﬁce is concave.
Theorem 3 Let Γ=( N;(V;E;i;v0);g;t)be a delivery problem and let (V;E;i) be a con-
nectedgraph consisting ofthecircuitv0;e 1;:::;em;v 0and thebridgeem+1 thatisnotconnected
to v0. Then the corresponding delivery game (N;c) is concave.
PROOF:Suppose that em+1 is connected to vp with p 6=0 . Consider the
delivery problem Γ0 =( N;(V 0;E;i 0;v 0);g;t 0) where (V 0;E;i 0) is the circuit
v0;e 1;:::;ep;v p;e m+1;v;e p+1;v p+1;:::;em;v 0. Further, t0(ep)=t ( e p )for all p 2f 1 ;:::;mg14
and t0(em+1)=0 .L e td 0
3be a minimal delivery tour ofT in Γ0 and let d0
4 be a minimal delivery





























0 (T [f jg )+t ( e m +1)i f g ( e m +1) 2 T [f jg
Let (N;c0) be the delivery game corresponding to Γ0, then
c
0(T [f jg )−c 0( T)=c ( T[f jg )−c ( T) (22)
Using the same arguments for coalition S we have that
c
0(S [f jg )−c
0( S)=c ( S[f jg )−c ( S) (23)
Sincethegraph inΓ0 is acircuit theorem 2yieldsthat (N;c0)is aconcave game. Theconcavity
of (N;c) then follows from the expressions (22) and (23).
2
Ag r a p h( V;E;i) is called a bridge-connected circuit graph if all the components of the
graph (V;E −B(G);i jE−B(G))are circuits or single vertices. The class of delivery problems
that arisesfrombridge-connectedcircuitgraphsis denotedbyDC(N). Thefollowingtheorem
will show that a delivery game corresponding to a delivery problem Γ 2 DC(N) is concave.
Before we can proof this theorem we need three lemmata which give some relations between
delivery tours of different coalitions.
The ﬁrst lemma shows that minimal delivery tours of T and T [f jgcoincide on the set of
followers of a bridge b 2 B(G) if e is not a follower of that bridge. Here, e 2 E is a follower
of a bridge b with respect to v0 if and only if each path v0;e 1;:::;ek;v k that contains e also
contains b. The set of followers of b will be denoted by Fb(G;v0):





d4 (T [f jg ) .
P ROOF:If Fb(G;v0) \ T = ; then d3 and d4 will not visit Fb(G;v0). Hence, we may assume
that Fb(G;v0) \ T 6= ;.S i n c e e 62 Fb(G;v0) we have that d3 and d4 have to visit the same
edges of T in Fb(G;v0). Consequencly, both tours will coincide on Fb(G;v0).
2
The next lemma shows that minimal delivery tours of T and T [f j gcoincide on the
predecessors of a bridge b if coalition T has a non-empty intersection with Fb(G;v0) and e is
a follower of b.15
Lemma 3 Let Γ=( N;(G;v0);g;t) 2 DC(N). Then for each b 2 B(G) such that T \





d4 (T [f jg )
P ROOF: Both delivery tours d3 and d4 have to visit the same edges in E − Fb(G;v0) since
e 2 Fb(G;v0). Moreover, both tours have to visit bridge b since Fb(G;v0) \ T 6= ;: This
implies that both tours have the same costs in E − (Fb(G;v0) −f b g ) .
2
The last lemma shows that the delivery tours of T [f j gand S [f j gcoincide on the
followers of b, excluded that bridge, if no player of T, and consequently no player of S,i sa
follower of b.
Lemma 4 LetΓ=( N;(G;v0);g;t)2DC(N)andletb 2 B(G).If T \(Fb(G;v0)−fbg)=;
then f
Γ;Fb(G;v0)−fbg
d2 (S [f jg )=f
Γ ;Fb(G;v0)−fbg
d4 (T [f jg ) .
P ROOF:I fe 62 Fb(G;v0) both delivery tours will not visit Fb(G;v0).I fe 2F b ( G;v0) both
delivery tours will choose fromb a shortest pathto e since no other edges have to be delivered
inFb(G;v0):Hence, inbothcases thedeliverytoursd2 andd4 havethesamecostsonFb(G;v0).
2
Before we can give the proof of the following theorem we need the notion of a bridge-
connected line graph. This is a bridge-connected circuit graph such that each circuit is
connected to at most two bridges.
Theorem 4 Let Γ=( N;(G;v0);g;t) 2 DC(N). Then the corresponding delivery game
(N;c) is concave.
PROOF: Lemma 2 implies that we can reduce the concavity problem to a delivery mod-
el corresponding to a bridge-connected line graph such that e 2 Fb(G;v0) and b is the
extreme bridge of the bridge-connected line graph. This reduction is illustrated in ﬁgure16
4.






























































If e = b then c(T [f j g )−c ( T)=− t ( e  )c ( S[f j g )−c ( S ) . If, on the other
hand, e 2 Fb(G;v0) −f b g , the following holds. Let Fb(G;v0) −f b g=f e 1;:::;emg and
take v such that i(e1) \ i(em) \ i(b)=v  . Next, consider the delivery problemΓ=
( A;(V 0;F b(G;v0);i 0;v);g jF b(G;v0)−fbg;t jF b(G;v0)−fbg) where A = g(Fb(G;v0) −f b g )and
(V 0;F b(G;v0);i 0) is the graph that denotes the circuit described by Fb(G;v0).L e t ( N;c)
be the delivery game corresponding to Γ. Then
c(T [f jg )−c ( T)= =f
Γ ;Fb(G;v0)−fbg
d4 (T [f jg )−f
Γ ;Fb(G;v0)−fbg
d3 (T)
= c((T \ A) [f jg )−c ( T\A )c ((S \ A)[f jg )−c ( S\A )17
= f
Γ;Fb(G;v0)−fbg
d2 (S [f jg )−f
Γ ;Fb(G;v0)−fbg
d1 (T)  c(S [f jg )−c ( S)
Here, the ﬁrst equality follows from lemma 3. The ﬁrst inequality by the concavi-
ty of (N;c) (cf. theorem 2). (ii) T \ Fb(G;v0)=; .Let b 2 B(G) be such that
Fb(G;v0) \ T 6= ; and T \ Fb0(G;v0)=;for all b0 2 B(G) \ (Fb(G;v0) −f b g ) .
Let ^ b 2 B(G) \ Fb(G;v0) be the bridge that is connected to the set Fb(G;v0) −
[b02(B(G)−fbg)\Fb(G;v0)Fb0(G;v0). Hence, ^ b is the closest bridge that follows b (see ﬁgure
6).
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Let B := (Fb(G;v0) [ ^ b) − (fbg[F ^ b( G;v0)) = f^ b;e1;:::;emg and take v such that
i(e1)\i(em) \i(b)=v  .L e t( V0;B;i 0)be the graph that arises from the set consisting of the
edges of B. Consider the delivery problem Γ=( A;(V 0;B;i 0;v);g jB;t jB)where A = g(B)
Let (N;c0) be the delivery game corresponding to Γ and let g(^ b)=j . Then
c(T [f jg )−c ( T)
=c 0((T \ A) [f j g )−c 0( T\A )+f
Γ ;F^ b(G;v0)−^ b
d4 (T [f jg )
c 0((S \ A) [f j
g )−c
0( S\A )+f
Γ ;F^ b(G;v0)−^ b
d4 (T [f jg )
=c
0((S \ A)[f j
g )−c
0( S\A )+f
Γ ;F^ b(G;v0)−^ b
d4 (S [f jg )
=c ( S[f jg )−c ( S)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the concavity of (N;c0) (cf. Theorem 3). The second
equality follows from lemma 4.
2
Finallywewillshowthatdeliverygamescorrespondingto deliveryproblemsthat arisefrom
bridge-connected cyclic graphs are concave. Recall that bridge-connected cyclic graphs are18
the graphs that after removing the bridges only have cycles or single vertices as components.
A cycle is a circuit or the union of edge-disjoint circuits. It is shown that each delivery
game which corresponds to a delivery model arising from a bridge-connected cyclic graph is
contained in a delivery game arising from a bridge-connected circuit graph. Therefore, we
consider a procedure that extends a bridge-connected cylic graph to a bridge-connected circuit
graph. Consider all kissing points in the bridge-connected cyclic graph. These are the vertices
of a graph that are in the intersection of at least two circuits and may be connected to some
bridges. Thisimpliesthatincaseakissingpointisremovedinagraphweobtainadisconnected
graph. The ﬁrst step in this procedure is to consider all kissing points that are the intersection
of two circuits. These circuits are split by replacing such a kissing point by a bridge. In step
two we consider the kissing points that are the intersection of at least three circuits. Then we
replace such a kissing point by a circuit in which the number of vertices is equal to the number
of circuits and bridges incident to that kissingpoint. Then we have new kissing points, but all
these kissingpoints are incident with at most two circuits. We repeat now the ﬁrst step of the
procedure. This procedure, which results in a bridge-connected circuit graph, is illustrated in
the following example.
Example 3 The graph G is a bridge-connected cyclic graph and the graph G is the
bridge-connected circuit graph that arises from G by the above described procedure.
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Let (V;E;i) be a bridge-connected cyclic graph and let (V;E;i) be the extension. Then
Γ=( M;(V;E;i;v0);g;t) is called the minimal extension of the delivery problem Γ=
( N;(V;E;i;v0);g;t)if g(e)=g ( e )for all e 2 E, t(e)=t ( e )for all e 2 E and t(e)=0for
all e 2 E − E. Note that N  M.
Lemma 5 Let Γ=( N;(V;E;i;v0);g;t) be a delivery problem and let Γ=19
(M;(V;E;i;v0);g;t) be the minimal extension of Γ.L e t ( N;c) be the delivery game cor-
responding to Γ and let (N;c) be the delivery game corresponding to Γ then
c(S)=c ( S ) for all S  N:
PROOF:If in Γ a kissing point is visited in a minimal delivery tour of a coalition S to visit
another circuit then the corresponding minimal delivery tour of S in Γ has to visit the new
bridges and some parts of a new cycle between these two circuits. Since these new edges have
travel costs equal to zero we have that the costs of a minimal delivery tour ofS in Γ coincides
with the costs of the corresponding delivery tour of S in Γ.
2 PROOF THEOREM 1: Follows
immediately from theorem 4 and lemma 5.
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